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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION-FEDERAL
REVIEW OF STATE STATUTES-ABSTENTION-The United

COURT

States
Supreme Court has held that federal courts must abstain from intervention into pending state proceedings under the Younger doctrine
when the federal plaintiff has an available state court opportunity to
raise his federal constitutional claim.
Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979)
On March 25, 1976, the appellant, Texas Department of Human
Resources (Department), received a report from school officials at the
Osborne Elementary School in Houston, Texas that a child, Paul Sims,
was suffering from physical injuries apparently inflicted upon him by
his father, the appellee,' during a recent visit to the elementary school.
On the same day, the Department took temporary custody2 of all three
Sims children enrolled in the school and had each examined by a physician who determined that the children were battered.' On the following
day, the Department instituted a suit in the Harris County juvenile
court for emergency protection of the children pursuant to provisions
of the Texas Family Code.' The juvenile court judge entered an

1. The appellees before the United States Supreme Court were the parents and
their three minor children. Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1979).
2. The Department took custody of the children under the authority of § 17.01 of
the Texas Family Code, which provided as follows:
An authorized representative of the State Department of Public Welfare, a lawenforcement officer, or a juvenile probation officer may take possession of a child to
protect him from an immediate danger to his physical safety and deliver him to any
court having jurisdiction of suits under this subtitle . . . . The child shall be
delivered immediately to the court.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.01 (Vernon 1975) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 17.03 (Vernon Supp. 1979)). The Department of Human Resources was
formerly the State Department of Public Welfare. 99 S. Ct. at 2375. The appellant, Hilmar
G. Moore, was the chairperson of the Department of Human Resources.
3. 99 S. Ct. at 2375. Paul Sims was hospitalized for eleven days as a result of the
injuries discovered during the medical examination. Id.
4. Section 17.02 of the Texas Family Code provided as follows:
Unless the child is taken into possession pursuant to a temporary order entered
by a court under § 11.11 of this code, the officer or representative shall file a petition in the court immediately on delivery of the child to the court, and a hearing
shall be held to provide for the temporary care or protection of the child.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.02 (Vernon 1975) (current version at TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 17.03-.04 (Vernon Supp. 1979)).
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emergency ex parte order' giving the Department temporary custody
of the Sims children.'
On March 31, 1976, the Simses, invoking the proper procedure for
terminating the Department's temporary custody,7 appeared in the
Harris County juvenile court with a motion to modify the ex parte
order. Since the juvenile court judge was unavailable for the hearing
required under, Texas state law,8 the motion to modify was returned to
the appellees' attorney. Rather than renew the motion or appeal the
emergency order, the appellees filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the same Harris County court.' At a hearing held on April 5th,
the court determined that venue was proper in Montgomery County
since the children resided there ° and transferred the proceedings
accordingly. 1" At the same time, the Harris County juvenile court
directed the Department to file a suit affecting the parent-child relationship.12 This suit was also transferred to Montgomery County. The
Harris County court also issued a temporary restraining order" con5. The ex parte order was issued pursuant to § 17.04 of the Texas Family Code,
which provided:
On a showing that the child is apparently without support and is dependent on
society for protection, or that the child is in immediate danger of physical or emotional injury, the court may make any appropriate order for the care and protection
of the child and may appoint a temporary managing conservator for the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.04 (Vernon 1975) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, §§ 17.02, 17,04(c) (Vernon Supp. 1979)).
6. 99 S. Ct. at 2375.
7. Id. at 2376. Section 17.06 of the Texas Family Code provides in pertinent part:
On the motion of a parent, managing conservator, or guardian of the person of
the child, and notice to those persons involved in the original emergency hearing,
the court shall conduct a hearing and may modify any emergency order . . . if found
to be in the best interest of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.06 (Vernon 1975) (repealed 1979).
8. 99 S. Ct. at 2376. See note 7 supra for the mandatory hearing provision of the
Texas Family code.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2376.
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.04(a) (Vernon 1975) provides with regard to
venue that "[elxcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a suit affecting the parentchild relationship shall be brought in the county where the child resides."
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2376.
12. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (current version at
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.04 (Vernon Supp. 1979)), provided that "[i]f the child is
not restored to the possession of its parent, guardian, or conservator the court shall ...
direct the filing of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship . ..."
13. The temporary restraining order was issued pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 2, § 11.11(a)(4) (Vernon 1975), which provides in pertinent part that "(a) [iun a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the court may make any temporary order for the safety
and welfare of the child, including but not limited to an order . . . (4) taking the child into
the possession of the court or of a person designated by the court ....
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tinuing the Department's custody of the children.'"
On April 19, 1976, the appellees filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas to enjoin the Department from instituting or continuing with any action under the Texas
Family Code. 5 Upon receiving notice of the federal action, the Department suspended the pending state proceedings in the Montgomery
County court. The appellees' petition for a temporary restraining order
was denied and the district court set May 5, 1976 as the hearing date
on the application for a preliminary injunction."6 After a hearing, the
federal court held that the temporary custody order issued by the Harris County court a month earlier had expired, and ordered the children
returned to their parents, with leave to the Department to institute a
new state action. The district court also noted that it was requesting a
three-judge court to consider the appellees' constitutional challenge to
the Texas Family Code.'7
On May 14th, in response to a new suit filed by the Department, the
Montgomery County juvenile court issued a show cause order and a
writ of attachment ordering Paul Sims delivered into the temporary
care of his grandparents.' 8 The show cause hearing was scheduled for
June 21, 1976.' On May 21st, however, the appellees filed a second petition in the federal district court for a temporary restraining order
aimed at the pending Montgomery County proceedings.' This order
was granted, and a three-judge court subsequently issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining the Department and other defendants
from prosecuting any state suit under the challenged statutes until a
final determination by the three-judge court.2'
On October 22, 1977, the federal court held that the state's child
abuse proceedings violated the due process clause of the fourteenth

14. 99 S. Ct. at 2376. The appellees made no attempt to expedite the hearing or to
appeal the temporary restraining order as provided by Texas law. Id
15. Id The appellees contended that Title 2 of the Texas Family Code violated their
constitutional right to due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Sims v.
State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
16. 99 S. Ct. at 2376. One day before the scheduled federal hearing, the appellees
moved for leave to file an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Texas
state court of appeals. The motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
17. Id The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1976)
(repealed 1976).
18. 99 S. Ct. at 2376-77.
19. The court originally set the show cause hearing for May 21, 1976, but when the
parents could not be found for purposes of service, the hearing was reset for June 21st.
Id at 2377.
20. Id
21. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. at 1183.
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amendment of the Federal Constitution.22 The district court initially
23
decided that abstention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris
was
inappropriate for three reasons. First, the district court found that the
denial of parental custody rights, regardless of the result of the pending hearing, was in itself sufficient to prevent the application of
Younger abstention." Second, the district court noted that procedural
irregularities and the absence of a fair opportunity to present the constitutional claims at a meaningful time warranted equitable relief even
if Younger principles did apply. 5 Finally, the federal court stated that
unlike a criminal prosecution," or a nuisance," contempt, 2 or attachment proceeding,29 there was no single state proceeding in which the
Simses could seek relief on constitutional or any other grounds." After
disposing of the threshold abstention issue, the district court found
that certain provisions of the Texas Family Code were unconstitutional." On appeal by the Department, the United States Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction32 to decide whether the federal
district court should have abstained under the principles of Younger.
Finding that abstention was warranted, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the federal district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint."
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, 4 first explained that
22. Id. at 1195. The district court's conclusion was based on a survey of virtually
every aspect of child abuse proceedings in Texas. Id. at 1189-95.
23. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts forbidden to stay or enjoin pending state
criminal proceedings).
24. 438 F. Supp. at 1187.
25. Id. at 1188.
26. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
27. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
28. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
29. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
30. 438 F. Supp. at 1188.
31. Id. at 1191. The district court held that the ex parte order removing the child
from his parent's custody violated due process since the order was based merely on the
showing that the relief sought was necessary to determine the existence of child abuse.
The three-judge panel further concluded that the confidential reports gathered under the
authority of the statute, but not made available to the family, violated the due process
clause. Id. Finally, the district court held that the state juvenile court's order directing
the filing of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, without having first conducted
an adversary hearing, violated due process guarantees. Id. at 1193.
32. 439 U.S. 925 (1978). Direct appeals to the United States Supreme Court from decisions of three-judge district courts were authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976) (repealed
1978).
33. 99 S. Ct. at 2383.
34. The Court was divided 5-4. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,,
and Powell joined the majority opinion. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens
dissented.
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the Younger doctrine reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in an ongoing state judicial proceeding in the absence of great and
immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.35 Noting that the
policy was first enunciated with reference to pending state criminal
prosecutions, the majority reemphasized that the concern about
displacing state courts with federal forums equally applied to those
civil suits which involved important state interests.' The Moore Court
reasoned that because the state was a party in the state proceedings,"
and because the removal of the child in the child abuse context was
closely related to criminal statutes," Younger principles applied to bar
the intervening federal action.' Justice Rehnquist noted that a federal
35. The strong policy against federal court intervention into pending state court proceedings can be traced to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), which provides
that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." The Supreme Court interpreted § 2283 as an absolute ban against federal injunctions of pending state proceedings
absent one of the recognized legislative exceptions. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). The Court, nonetheless, in
Younger, retreated from this position by carving out a judicial exception to § 2283 where
the federal petitioner could demonstrate great and immediate irreparable harm. 401 U.S.
at 46. The suit in Younger was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The Court, however, failed to decide whether § 1983 was a legislative exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act. One year later, in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court
reformed its position by holding that § 1983 was indeed a legislative exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act rather than a judicial exception. The Court reasoned that since § 1983
created a federal remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, it thus permitted injunctive relief directed at pending state actions. Id. at 238. The Court concluded by noting
that recognition of § 1983 as a legislative exception to § 2283 did not modify the traditional view that federal courts were restrained in the exercise of their injunctive powers
by the principles of comity and federalism. Id. at 243.
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2377. The applicability of Younger abstention principles to quasicriminal proceedings was first articulated in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)
(federalism and comity mandates federal abstention where litigation involves important
state interests). See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
37. The state's presence as a party to the pending state action gives it an interest in
the suit. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 604.
38. A quasi-criminal statute is closely related to and actually aids a criminal statute,
which is a traditional concern of the state. See id.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 2377. The Moore court stated that the presence of vital state concerns or the vindication of important state policies militated in favor of Younger abstention. Id. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (safeguarding fiscal integrity of
state public assistance program sufficient to trigger application of Younger principles);
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court must abstain unless it is shown that the state proceedings were
motivated by a desire to harass or were conducted in bad faith, or if
the challenged statute flagrantly and patently violates express constitutional prohibitions." The Moore Court found, however, that the
district court in the instant controversy did not rely upon these
established exceptions in finding that abstention was inappropriate.41
The majority then analyzed the reasons put forth by the district
court for not applying Younger abstention. Focusing upon the meaning
of the term "multifaceted litigation," as used by the district court, the
Supreme Court concluded that neither of the two possible intepretations provided an adequate ground for federal intervention. The Court
first rejected the possibility that the appellees were unable to raise
their constitutional challenges in the pending state proceeding by
noting that Texas law presented no procedural barriers to resolution
of those issues."2 The Court emphasized that federal abstention was
warranted solely on the basis that the appellees had an opportunity
to advance their constitutional claims in the state court." Because
state law did not bar the interposition of the constitutional claims, the
Court concluded that abstention was appropriate."' The Court likewise
rejected the possibility that abstention was unwarranted because of
the breadth of the appellees' challenge to the Texas child abuse
statutory scheme. The Moore majority noted that federal sensitivity to
the states' primacy in interpreting its own laws has traditionally
militated in favor of abstention when a state statute is broadly
challenged.45 The Court reiterated the concern first expressed in
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.," about federal courts being asked

to interpret state law without the benefit of the state court's consideration. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that almost every constitutional claim, and particularly one as far-reaching as the claim in the instant controversy, afforded the state court the opportunity to obviate
the need to reach the constitutional issue by narrowing the construcJuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (enforcement of state court contempt proceedings vital
enough for application of Younger principles).
40. 99 S. Ct. at 2377. See also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 611.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 2377. See text accompanying notes 24-25 & 30 supra.
42. 99 S. Ct. at 2378. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.02(b) (Vernon 1975) states:
"One or more matters covered by this subtitle may be determined in the suit. The court,
on its own motion, may require the parties to replead in order that any issue affecting the
parent-child relationship may be determined in the suit."
43. 99 S. Ct. at 2378. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 337.
44. 99 S. Ct. at 2378.
45. Id. at 2379.
46. 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention mandated where state law unsettled, state process
provides adequate means of litigation, and decision on state law may be dispositive of
case).
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tion of the challenged statute. Thus, when federal courts interject
themselves into the dispute, they prevent the evolution of state policy
by state tribunals. The Moore Court stated that intervention could be
justified only if state courts were incompetent to adjudicate federal
constitutional claims, a postulate which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and emphatically rejected."' The majority summarized its
analysis of the question by ruling that the sole pertinent inquiry for
Younger abstention is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims."
Finally, the Court examined the facts of the Moore controversy to
determine if any of the recognized exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine were present." Justice Rehnquist found that the state
agency was not motivated by bad faith or a desire to harass 5° the
Simses in instituting the state proceeding. The majority reasoned that
the procedural difficulty encountered by appellees was the predictable
by-product of a new state statute which could not be equated with bad
faith.5 Nor could intervention be justified on the basis of the second
exception to Younger; as the district court correctly found,52 the Texas
statute was not flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.51 The potential applicability of the third and final
exception to Younger abstention, that of extraordinary circumstances,5'
was determined by examining the status quo at the time federal intervention was sought. Justice Rehnquist noted that the appellees had
custody of Paul Sims and that a date had been set for the show cause
hearing. The majority concluded that the issuance of the writ of
attachment for the child did not constitute great and immediate irreparable harm requiring federal court intervention.5 5 Because the appel47. 99 S. Ct. at 2380. See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 443; Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. at 336; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 610-11; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 460-61 (1974).
48. 99 S. Ct. at 2381. The Court noted that the opportunity requirement was satisfied
if the constitutional claim could be raised in any manner, stating:
There is no magic in the term "defense" when used in connection with the Younger
doctrine if the word "defense" is intended to be used as a term of art. We do not
here deal with the long past niceties which distinguished among "defense,"
"counterclaims," "set offs," "recoupments," and the like.
Id. at 2381 n.12.
49. Id. at 2382. Federal courts should not enjoin pending state proceedings in the
absence of a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, bad faith, or extraordinary circumstances.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
50. 99 S. Ct. at 2382. See note 49 supra.
51. 99 S. Ct. at 2382. See text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
52. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
53. 99 S. Ct. at 2382. See text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
54. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 611. See also note 77 infra.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2383.
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lees had an adequate opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in
the state proceeding and none of the exceptions to the Younger
abstention doctrine were present, the Court reversed the decision of
the district court.
Justice Stevens, speaking for the dissenters, contended that
Younger abstention was inappropriate in the Moore case since there
was no adequate pending state action in which the appellees could
have fairly pursued their constitutional claims. The dissenters noted
that the appellees challenged the validity of a statute which allowed
the seizure and detention of the children for forty-two days without a
hearing. Justice Stevens maintained that the pending state suit, which
involved questions of the appellees' fitness as parents and permanent
custody of Paul Sims, was an inadequate forum for resolution of the
unrelated constitutional issues." Because of the _prehearing seizure
and the unrelated nature of the constitutional issue to the state proceedings, Justice Stevens asserted that the statutory procedures were
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Moore is the latest development in
the doctrine of federal court abstention in the face of an ongoing state
court proceeding.58 In its landmark decision in Younger,59 the Court
held that principles of comity and federalism dictated the dismissal of
an intervening federal suit when the plaintiff could present his constitutional claims in a pending state action."0 The Younger Court stated
that notions of comity and federalism involved deference to and proper
respect for state court functions. The Court reasoned that the national
government would fare best if the individual states were permitted to
perform their own functions free from federal interference. 1 The
Younger ruling recognized the legitimate interest the federal government had in protecting federal rights and constitutional guarantees,
but required this function to be carried out in a manner that did not
intrude upon the proper interests of the states. Thus, in the majority
of situations, Younger required federal courts to abstain when asked to
enjoin a pending state prosecution.62
56. Id. at 2383-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2387-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See note 35 supra.
59. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
60. Id. at 43-46. The Court also relied on a basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that
courts of equity should not act when the petitioner has an adequate legal remedy and will
not suffer irreparable harm if denied injunctive relief. Justice Black stated that the doctrine prevented the erosion of the jury's role and a duplication of legal proceedings and
sanctions where a single suit would be sufficient to protect the rights asserted. Id. at
43-44.
61. Id. at 43-44,
62. Id. at 45.
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In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 3 the Supreme Court extended the principles of the Younger abstention doctrine to encompass civil proceedings which the Court characterized as quasi-criminal in nature.
Although the challenged statute in Huffman was in aid of and closely
related to criminal statutes, it was not this fact which dictated abstention. Instead, it was the overriding concepts of comity and federalism
which led the Court to extend the doctrine." The Huffman Court further held that Younger principles applied where state appellate
remedies had not been fully exhausted.65 In the same year as Huffman,
the Court clarified the breadth of the abstention principle by defining
the threshold concept of pending state proceeding. In Hicks v. Miranda," the Court held that Younger principles applied to a federal suit
filed prior to the state action provided that no proceedings on the
merits had taken place in the federal forum.67 The Hicks ruling foreclosed a race to the courthouse by a federal plaintiff seeking to circumvent the application of Younger. The Supreme Court's adherence to
the seminal policies of comity and federalism were next expressed in
Juidice v. Vail,68 where the justices stated that the federal plaintiff
need only be afforded an opportunity to raise his federal claims in the
state court proceedings in order for Younger principles to apply. 9
0
Finally, in Trainor v. Hernandez,"
a divided Court held that prehearing deprivations of property without notice to garnishees accomplished
under color of state statute did not warrant federal intervention if the
63. 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (federal court must abstain from interfering with ongoing civil
nuisance proceeding).
64. Id. at 604.
65. Id at 609.
66. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
67. Id at 349. In Hicks, police seized copies of an allegedly obscene film from the
federal plaintiffs' theatre and filed criminal charges against two theatre employees. The
state court, after viewing the film, declared it obscene and ordered all copies seized from
the theatre. The federal plaintiffs did not appeal this order but instead sought injunctive
relief in federal district court against future prosecution under the obscenity statute. One
day after the federal suit was filed, the municipal court criminal complaint was amended
to include the federal plaintiffs as additional defendants. Id at 335-39. The federal district
court held the state statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that abstention under Younger was proper even though no
criminal prosecution had been initiated against the federal plaintiffs in the state court
when the federal suit was filed. Younger was applied because no proceedings on the
merits had taken place in the federal court when the state action was commenced. Id. at
349.
68. 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (federal court must abstain from interfering with ongoing
state civil contempt proceeding).
69. Id at 337.
70. 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (federal court must abstain from interfering with ongoing
state civil contempt enforcement proceeding).
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the procedure could be adjudicated in a
constitutional challenge to
1
proceeding.
state
pending
These later precedents established that the hallmark of Younger
abstention was simply the pendency of a state proceeding in which the
federal plaintiff could raise his federal claims. Since the pendency of a
state action triggers the application of the doctrine," the rationale of
the abstention requirement is that ordinarily a pending state proceeding provides the litigant with a fair and sufficient opportunity for
vindication of federal constitutional rights.7" Moore v. Sims further
elucidates the scope of the opportunity concept given only a cursory
discussion in Juidice. Moore stands for the proposition that the opportunity to raise the constitutional claim is present if the federal plaintiff
can advance his challenge in the pending state action by way of a permissive counterclaim or similar procedural device rather than strictly
in the rigid sense of a defense." Thus, a federal court asked to enjoin a
pending state court proceeding must now scrutinize the particular
state's rules of civil procedure. If any procedural possibility for advancing the constitutional issue exists in the pending state action, and in
the absence of a recognized exception to the rule of abstention, the
federal court must abstain.
While Moore expands the breadth of the opportunity concept, the
Court did little to preserve the already imperiled exceptions to the
Younger doctrine. These often enunciated but seldom applied exceptions are state proceedings motivated by bad faith or harassment," a
statute which is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,76 or extraordinary circumstances.7 The viability of

71. Id. at 439-40.
72. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (Younger considerations of equity,
comity, and federalism have no effect in absence of ongoing state action).
73. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
at 460 (pending state proceeding provides federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindication of constitutional rights).
74. 99 S. Ct. at 2381 n.12. See note 48 supra.
75. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
76. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. at 402.
77. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. The Supreme Court discussed the extraordinary circumstances exception in detail in Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. at 124-25, but has not to
date applied it to a case on review. Commentators have suggested that the application of
the Younger exceptions does not conflict with the notions of comity and federalism since
the state has no legitimate interest in trying a case if any of the exceptional situations are
involved. See Comment, Federal Courts- Younger Doctrine-State Criminal Defendant
Must Exhaust State Appellate Remedies Before Seeking Federal Relief on Matters Collateral to the Merits of the State Prosecution, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1212, 1230 (1977). See
also Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings:Dombrowsk Younger,
and Beyond 50 TEx. L. REV. 1324, 1340, 1343 (1972).
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the flagrant statute exception was questionable prior to Moore
because, to date, the Supreme Court has not sanctioned federal inter7
vention into a pending state court proceeding under this exception. 1
The reason may have been the all-encompassing standard which
requires the statute to be flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph,
and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be
made to apply it."9
Moreover, the Court's discussion of the principles of the Pullman
abstention doctrine'O in the context of a Younger case can only be
taken as an indication that the flagrant statutes exception is of limited
utility. The reference to Pullman expresses the Court's view that the
policy considerations behind Pullman are also engaged when a federal
court is asked to enjoin a pending state action based on the flagrant
statute exception." This hesitancy reflects the Pullman concern that
state courts have greater latitude in construing state statutes than do
federal courts. 2 The conjunctive effect is to foreclose federal intervention if the challenged statute has not been interpreted by the state
courts. Where the opportunity to raise the constitutional challenge
exists in an ongoing state action, the state court is presumed competent' to decide whether a narrow construction of the contested

78. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
Spears, The Supreme Court FebruarySextet; Younger v. HarrisRevisited, 26 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1, 46-48 (1974). But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where a Texas physician being prosecuted in state court for violations of Texas' abortion laws sought to intervene in
a federal action brought by a woman challenging the constitutionality of the same statute.
The Court held that Younger barred the physician from intervening in the federal suit,
but reached the merits of the female's constitutional challenge. Id. at 125-27. After declaring the Texas statute unconstitutional, the Court expressed its conviction that the Texas
authorities would not continue to prosecute persons under the statute. Id. at 166. Thus,
even though the physician was denied intervention under Younger, the relief afforded Roe
effectively precluded state prosecution against him under the statute.
79. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611; Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54.
80. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. Pullman abstention applies where no
state action is pending and mandates only stay of federal jurisdiction rather than outright
dismissal. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1043 (2d ed. 1973).
81. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 445; Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REV. 535,
538 (1970).
82. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 445. Moreover, the Younger doctrine commands that mere facial invalidity of the state statute is insufficient for federal intervention. 401 U.S. at 54.
83. 99 S. Ct. at 2380; Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 443; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
at 336; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 610-11; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at
460-61.
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statute is possible and if not, whether the statute is flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.'
The Moore Court's unambiguously broad definition of the opportunity concept" also raises questions about the need for a separate exception of bad faith8" once it is shown that the federal claim can be
litigated in the pending state proceedings. A state court willing to
hear federal claims could not reasonably be accused of bad faith." Conversely, if a state court refuses to hear a federal claim, there is little
reason for a federal court to question if the refusal was motivated by
bad faith. In such a situation, a federal court could intervene without
reliance on any of the Younger exceptions, since the opportunity to be
heard in state court is an absolute prerequisite to Younger
abstention."
If the bad faith exception cannot be applied to the conduct of a state
court, then the only other possible application of the exception is when
the prosecution is undertaken in bad faith. Yet once the state court
has shown its willingness to hear a federal defense to a state prosecution, it is unclear why the state court should be denied the power to do
so because of the improper motives of the prosecutor. In the procedural context of all Younger cases, the state court has done all that
it can be expected to do once it has agreed to hear the federal
defense." Thus, a federal injunction operates to preclude a state court
from carrying out its constitutional responsibilities. ' It has been suggested that federal intervention to halt a bad faith prosecution is
justified because the state has no vital interest in overseeing prosecutions instituted in bad faith."1 However, when faced with a federal
claim, the constitutional responsibility of a state court judge is identical to the constitutional responsibility of a federal judge. Since the
constitutional responsibilities are identical, the preference for a federal
84. See 99 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
85. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
86. The exception for state proceedings motivated by bad faith has enjoyed a more
frequent discussion and application. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (Supreme
court remanded to determine whether there were pending prosecutions and if so, whether
such prosecutions were brought in bad faith); Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1972) (black youth prosecuted excessively for simple battery).
87. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
88. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. at 124.
89. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States .. .shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby ...
91. See note 77 supra.
92.

See note 90 supra.
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forum can be justified only if federal judges are more competent to
carry out these responsibilities than are state judges. This, however, is
a proposition that the Supreme Court has consistently refused to
accept. 3 Federal intervention when the state court has shown every
indication of fidelity to its constitutional responsibility, simpy because
the prosecutor is acting badly, reflects negatively upon the ability of
state judges and is counter to the stated goals of Younger abstention."
Moore v. Sims continues the trend of closing the federal forum to a
litigant who is involved in a pending state action. The broad definition
given the opportunity requirement of Younger precludes federal intervention into an ongoing state proceeding where the federal plaintiff
has any procedural mechanism which allows him to raise constitutional
challenges in the state system. 5 The focus of future Younger decisions
should, therefore, be the availability of state opportunities for determining constitutional questions. Moore unequivocally mandates that if
such an opportunity is present, the. federal courts must ordinarily exercise total equitable restraint." By limiting the availability of the
federal forum, the Moore decision further delineates the proper forum
allocation for constitutional litigation" while simultaneously promoting
the principles of comity and federalism at the foundation of Younger
abstention.
David C. Levenreich
93.
94.
95.

See cases cited at note 47 supra.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 460-61.
See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
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See text accompanying note 74 supra.

97.

See Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.

REV. 1133, 1282 (1977).

